this reconciliation, he sacrifices himself symbolically in the form of his feast taro. But as the myth states, this sacrifice is not a final death. After the feast is over, the feast-giver is more spiritually potent than ever, having obtained the assistance of his own ancestral spirits. He is thus able to overcome his enemies.

Although these ideas are all in some way implicit in gifts of feasting taro, their threatening aspects are kept very much in the background, as the ostensible purpose of the occasion is to establish amity. If the gift represents a display, in very pacific form, of the donor's power, it also offers an opportunity for communion as the recipient consumes food imbued with the spirit of the donor and the donor's spirit thus becomes, as it were, part of him.

At this point we may summarise in a more formal manner the results of our analysis. The insight we have obtained into the meaning of taro gifts suggests that part of the Totoima myth may be represented by the following exchange cycle:

MODEL 18



This diagram does not represent the transaction between Totoima and his son (which has already been analysed in model 5)[A] but rather the transaction between the taro woman (Totoima's daughter) and the man from Managalase. Here the man acted as protector while the woman provided nurture. The man from Managalase is primarily a hunter. He arrives on the scene with a wallaby slung over his arm. When he finds Totoima's son with his innards missing, he replaces these with the innards of the wallaby, thus enabling the son to kill his father. Clearly the meaning is that man, while having nothing but taro inside him, becomes necessarily the victim of the wild pig (Totoima), but when he has meat inside him he becomes strong and able to kill the wild pig. Thus man, by his concern with hunting and the provision of meat, becomes a protector to his wife.

The Managalase is a neighbouring district where the main crop is yam, not taro, though a variety of inferior taro (*pijama*) is grown in small bush clearings. The Managalase magician is therefore in an intermediate position between Totoima and his son. Unlike Totoima he recognises the technology and domestication of taro, but inadequately as he is mainly a hunter. Such, at least, is the Orokaiva view of Managalase.

Taro, for the Orokaiva, is symbolic of strength; it is preferred to other staples because it is believed to build stronger men. The success of an Orokaiva feast is measured principally by the amount of taro that changes hands. It is significant that in the fighting between Orokaiva and Managalase, the former were most often the agressors and the latter the victims of cannibal raids, inroads on

A [See Category 773, p. 64--Analyst]

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

hunting territories and the like. Thus the Orokaiva regard themselves as stronger than Managalase (certainly they are more numerous as their fertile land can support a far denser population), which served to show the superiority of taro over yam.

The taro myth discussed above may therefore be recognised as a charter for two contrasting types of taro gift made by Orokaiva. Woman provides cooked taro domestically but man, in providing the raw feasting taro, employs taro as a symbol of fighting strength. Heaped up in the manner of sacrificial victims, they are given to guests, not so much to express commensality as to display and offer for consumption the competitive strength of the donating group.

4. *A Survey of Taro Gifts*

One special interest that taro gifts hold for the field anthropologist is their great frequency which opens the possibility of statistical analysis of a fairly large number of gifts of a fairly homogeneous kind. Twenty-two households were visited daily (or almost daily) providing a record of taro gifts made over twenty-eight days from 31 January to 10 March, 1967. Informants were asked to whom they had sent presents during that day and from whom they had received presents. The survey provided useful incidental information about visitors who had been in the village during the day without my knowledge, and about gifts of objects other than taro. For the purpose of analysis I ignored gifts made to persons not resident in the village, as these were scattered over a great many villages and the survey period was not long enough to establish statistical regularities. Waddell reported that 40 per cent of taro gifts were made to persons outside the village (Sivepe), 10 per cent to villages within one mile of Sivepe, 14 per cent to villages situated between one and two miles from Sivepe, 9 per cent to more distant villages and 6 per cent to expatriate centres. (1968: 218). The statistics compiled by Waddell, however, are in terms of weight rather than the number of gifts. A gift of cooked taro made within a village was for one meal only (averaging perhaps 5 lbs.) while a gift of raw taro made to visitors from other villages or at feasts was more likely to weigh at least 25 lbs. Thus the number of gifts made to persons other than villagers was less than 10 per cent of the total.

As I intend to draw some significant conclusions from the statistics of intra-village taro gifts, it is relevant to describe briefly some difficulties I had in collecting these statistics. The fact that households were asked to report on gifts received as well as gifts made provided an effective check, as ideally all items should have been mentioned twice, once by the donor household and once by the recipient household. People very often forgot to tell me of some of the gifts received and made. Some people were most likely to forget what they had received; others would forget what they had given. If my study had been biased towards psychological anthropology, the frequency of these types of memory lapses among individuals might have given me a basis for establishing a typology of exchange partners. I soon found that nobody claimed gifts they had not actually made or received

From the first day of the survey it became obvious that my questions, simple though they seemed, contained an unexpected ambiguity: should the informant

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

The evidence presented in the previous section shows that we are in fact concerned not with one exchange cycle (i.e. model 25) but with two. The second cycle represents the exchange of sanctions which preceded the feast. Though our data with regard to both the Togahou-Sivepe and the Sangara-Koipa (Isivita) wars are rather fragmentary, we do know that there were a number of raids, the last of which are still known to informants today and date back no more than 60 years. Each side is reported to have raided the other; there were killings; there was cannibalism; women were abducted. Sangara admits having abducted Isivita women but denies that any of its own women were abducted; abductions between Sivepe and Togahou can be shown to have been mutual. The last killings were too long ago for me to be sure which side had made the last raid and which side had, in the finish, a favourable tally of killings. Sivepe and Hohorita both claimed to have come out on the winning side, but I had no opportunity to check the evidence with Togahou and Isivita. If we accept the Sivepe and Hohorita versions, both these villages were in the unpleasant position of having enemies who were still seeking revenge.

Due to the restraints of the *pax Australiana*, this revenge could not take the form of an armed raid, but sorcery was still a possible form of relaliation, as the Australian authorities could not easily detect this. Both Sivepe and Hohorita might therefore justifiably fear sorcery from their old enemies, supposing they wanted to even the scores. There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that either Togahou or Koipa had such ideas in mind, but whenever misfortunes happened to Sivepe people in Togahou, or to gardens in Hohorita, the thought of sorcery used by old enemies seemed reasonable to the Orokaiva. We may represent the exchange of sanctions, prior to the feasts, in the following diagram:

MODEL 26

In order to account for pig sacrifice, we require both model 25 (showing the social exchange achieved by the feast) and model 26 (showing the circumstances which made Hohorita into an 'offender' and Koipa into an 'offended' party). In addition, we need to explain why the groups involved decided to adopt new objects of exchange in their social relationship. Until recently, the two sides exchanged enmity which they mediated by various penalties such as raids and sorcery. At the time of the feast, however, we find the same two parties exchanging expiation and forgiveness. It is possible to invoke a number of historical contingencies to explain this change. Informants liked to tell me that the change was due to the effect of the *iji eha*: the fact that everybody was baptised and moving into a new age when old enmities should be forgotten. I

A,B [See Category 574, p. 148--Analyst]

S: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

574 could not help noticing the connection between the reconciliation and the
628 simultaneous fear of sorcery to which I have already referred. But perhaps
neither historical explanation is necessary.

721 It seems clear from Williams' evidence and from the little I could reconstruct
728 in 1966 that Orokaiva history had been one long sequence of hostilities and reconciliations. The reasons for the reconciliations were various: the legalising of marriages after abductions, the expediency of forming alliances with old enemies when faced with the threat of new enemies, a desire for peace after some Pyrrhic victories, and so on. On the level of myth we find the same message: the permanent state of *isoro* was interrupted by periodic feasts (see model 1).[1] The series starts, according to myth, with a state of primordial peace. This is followed by *isoro, peka, isoro* in permanent alternation. We may represent the total pattern by the series of congruent ellipses drawn on parallel planes directly above one another (see Model 27).

I have presented transactions in historical time by a series of four transactions, the first and last of which are purely exchanges of penalties. Cycle 2 represents an agreement between two opponents to cease warfare and make peace (*peka*). This cycle would normally start with a message, sent by the original aggressor, that he is ready to make amends. This message would be followed by a visit from the other party to the aggressor, when the latter would promise to hold a feast. A customary practice at such a meeting was for the aggressor to plant a cordiline (*poponda*) in evidence of this promise. The aggressor would then arrange a pig sacrifice.

Cycle 3 would be marked by peace (*peka*). The victim of the original aggression would give a return feast which was probably obligatory. If the basic end of pig sacrifice were communion or expiation, no return feast would be necessary, but as we have found the basic end to be the establishment or restoration of social relations, on a basis of equality, there must be a balance of prestations. Each side must sacrifice pigs; each side must dance for the other; each side must dispel black magic from the gardens of the other. Each side must expiate past offences and each side must extend forgiveness. But the model shows that such reconciliation is not expected to be more than temporary although, of course, friendship between villages can sometimes be maintained for protracted periods and there is no rule against holding feasts before a quarrel has reached deadly proportions.

571 The model applies not only to inter-village relations but to all social relations
602 in general, consanguineal and affinal relations included. Quarrels between
578 consanguines differ only in their relatively greater reluctance to resort to an
754 exchange of penalties and greater readiness to settle a quarrel before it has gone too far. But here a great deal is said to depend on the type of kin relationship holding between the quarrelling parties. A father or mother will rarely use sorcery or other harmful measures against his or her children. Certainly they will not do so until they have, in the course of the quarrel, broken off social relations by showing their plant emblem. Usually a quarrel does not go beyond the breaking off of relations, but if further unpleasantness should occur and if the person who has caused anger is experiencing some misfortune, sorcery will at once be suspected. The same is true in case of conflict with the father's or the mother's brother, though the showing of the plant emblem does not, in such

A [See Category 574, p. 58--Analyst]

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 157]

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MODEL 27



743 The Public Health Department maintains a large base hospital at Saiho, 5 miles from Sivepe. A vegetable market at Saiho, originally established to supply the hospital, now serves a wider range of customers and at present is open every Thursday and Saturday (E. Waddell: personal communication). A few Sivepe people in our sample sell vegetables there regularly but seldom buy anything except lime (for chewing with betel nut). There are well-stocked trade stores at Saiho and Awala and a Savings Bank agency at Awala. In 1963 a trade store was established near Sasembata, by a member of Kongahambo village.

177 We could not complete this introductory sketch of local facilities and conditions without noting the traumatic experiences of the mountain Orokaiva during the life-span of the older men. Even an abbreviated description of local attitudes towards introduced economic and social changes such as we attempt later, would be inadequate unless it alluded to the likely deep impact of the following events.

First, the early government patrols, which encountered widespread opposition from the Orokaiva, were attacked most persistently by the 'Wasida' people who include the Sivepe villagers. Fighting was fierce and many of the old men we talked to had seen close relatives killed or wounded.

Second, during World War II the paths of advance and retreat of Australian and Japanese troops crossed this area and the Orokaiva were 'drawn in as helpers, willingly or unwillingly, on both sides of the lines'.[1] Some Orokaiva groups also became involved in intertribal skirmishes at this time - during our stay an imminent military exercise occasioned apprehensions among some Orokaiva about a possible resumption of dormant intertribal conflict at the time of the exercise.

Scattered for safety in the bush while the wartime campaigns swept the area, many people in the neighbourhood of Sivepe died of malnutrition. In addition, there was very thorough recruiting of local men for subsequent phases of the war elsewhere in the Territory. In 1948 patrol staff reported that there was cause for concern in the continued decline in population.[2] At this

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[1] Keesing 1951:8. For an account of this episode see McCarthy 1959: Ch. 4, 10 ff., see esp. pp.110, 126n and maps pp.123, 357.

[2] The war was said to have been a contributing factor; moreover, many villagers were employed as labourers on local European plantations and returned only at weekends; more important, the percentage of able-bodied males absent elsewhere as indentured labour had reached 31 and the officer accordingly recommended in 1948 that the area including Isoge, Isivita and Awala villages be closed to recruiting.

Chapter 3

Land tenure and social structure

a. The tribe and clan as territorial or political units

128 This section outlines the range of wider common territorial
[614] interests and concerted political action among traditional
[619] groupings. Clans are the largest units in which membership is determined by patrilineal filiation as distinct from the local allegiance underlying membership of the tribe, and of the 'district', village, etc., into which the tribe may be divided.

619 The tribe is the largest unit which has a common territory (Williams 1930:156-7). This is usually isolated from neighbouring tribal territories by a belt of uninhabited country and its occupants would speak of it as 'one ground', pusu tahavo. The territories of groups of various orders of inclusiveness within the tribe are also described in this way (see Williams 0.364; 1930:157).

[829] Members of a group of any of these levels might consider themselves as toho, 'countrymen' (see Williams 1930:166; 0.100, 364). In another context a group would consider others in the same tribe as kitoho (outsiders, aliens). All members of the tribe shared common enmities so that at times they would regard themselves as toho whereas neighbouring tribes were always considered kitoho.[1]

[578] There were customary restrictions upon feuding within the tribe. As Williams (1930:309 ff.) points out, this political unit is the largest group with its own intragroup morality, in this case
[266] sharply distinguished from the standard forms of hostility between
[721] tribes. Aggression against members of another tribe took the form of organized, often cannibalistic raids (isoro).

[1] Williams (1930:160) mentions exceptions where 'friendship or affinity between certain tribes allowed the use of the former word' (toho), but 'tribes...normally stand in the mutual relation of Kitohu' (sic) (ibid: 170; see also 0.100, 364).

628 There were ordinarily no persons who could command the
701 allegiance of the tribe as a whole, nor was there any status with authority to effect the settlement of disputes between different
166 subgroups or their individual members. Sometimes persistent intratribal conflicts led to short-term migration or to a splinter-group's secession from the tribe. However, these disturbances were very minor in comparison with the 'flight, dispersal and migration' in general resulting from incessant intertribal[1] feuds (see p.35).

701 Kinship and local affiliation together were the basic principles by which subgroups of the raiding party seem to have been drawn up during attack and on which leaders[2] within the party based their rights to command specific combatants.

721 Retaliation was as important a motive for isoro as was individual and group prestige. It was 'rare if not impossible' for
728 tribes to settle hostilities amicably by compensation, exchange of hostages or other means (Williams 1930:166, 170 ff., 311 ff.).

721 Conquering groups operating from within their established territorial frontiers seem seldom to have set out with the express aim of acquiring new land for settlement or even to have used the vacated land when they forced their enemies to withdraw.[3] Nevertheless, the Aiga people (mostly the Timbariundi, i.e., wanderers), for instance, are known to have migrated to their present territory by expelling another tribe and settling on their land.

The high value of the land on the volcanic slopes occupied by the people called 'Periho' and 'Wasida' (by Plant and Williams,

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1 'Intertribal', 'interclan', etc., are terms which we apply to relationships between any - i.e., not necessarily all - representatives of the units in question.

2 In the course of a raid, some of these leaders would assume the role of isoro ambo jigari, a man who should rally the slowest of his company in attack and protect the stragglers during withdrawal; the other class of leader was known as isoro kiti jigari, that is, a warrior who ordinarily directs raiding groups from in front and takes the initiative in tactical decisions. Kiti jigari is sometimes a term for leaders in ordinary village activities (kiti, the first, foremost; jigari, one who directs and controls an enterprise); cf. pp.51-3. See also Williams (W.23) who was told that in pre-contact times a renowned member of Sarahu clan would lead from behind in attacks by men of the Jegasi-Sarahu villages (of the 'Wasida' tribe).

3 As the Sangara did to the Divinikovari, for instance (Williams O.12).

A. [See Category 721, p. 35--Analyst]

721 see p.6) and by the Sangara would have been common knowledge but the neighbouring tribes on the plains were well endowed with land. Land shortage and territorial ambitions were seldom likely to have been sufficient to induce warriors to conquer new lands from traditional enemies.[1]

628 721 Williams (1930:151) says that the Hunjovarehu (including the people of Divinikovari) and the 'Wasida' people to their south are 2 subdivisions of 1 tribe but in other contexts (1930:166) he mentions that these 2 groups carried out organized raids on each other's territory; these were frequent and were characteristic only of intertribal feuds. He refers also to the 'Wasida' as traditional enemies of the Divinikovari 'tribe' (0.9). Monckton too (Territory of Papua 1904-5:36) had reported that the 'Wasida' used frequently to raid ' the low-lying villages of the Kumusi' including the Nimanakvari (or Divinikovari) 'tribe'; indeed, the ancestors of some of the men at Sivepe were killed while fighting the Divinikovari, Togahau and Asigi people to the north. 'The people known as Hunjovarehu' and 'the people of the Periho group', according to Plant, should not be regarded as members of the same tribe (1951: Appendix 4). Informants said that their ancestors were not involved in the isoro which the Wasida villagers fought with the Orokaiva of Sairope - and at times with those at Baropi (Wairope) - and with the people of the Managalas Mountains to the south (see Reay 1953:118; Williams W.23).

Our reason for arguing that all the mountain Orokaiva - the Sangara as well as the Periho (i.e., Wasida) - constituted 1 tribe, is that the basic criterion for identifying a tribe as a distinct unit is its members' joint political activity, as Williams says (1925:406; 1930:156) - the 'almost perpetual state of war with its neighbours'.

619 721 634 In feuds with neighbouring Orokaiva of tribes to the north, members of the Awala District had regular alliances with people as distant as Koropata to the west and the Sangara to the east. However, on no occasion known to us did the mountain Orokaiva as a whole combine in defence or attack en masse. It is even unlikely that the Periho 'welded themselves into a solid group', which Plant (1951:3) claims 'was based on political necessity', defended a recognized common boundary and combined to conduct isoro as a unit.[2] At the time of pacification they alone must

[1] This is true of almost all New Guinea societies, whatever the extent of their political organization: exceptions include Chimbu and the Mae Enga (see Brown and Brookfield 1959:42).

[2] Plant's inclusion of the Wairopi and Sairopi districts in the tribe (see p.6) is hard to reconcile with statements by Williams (W.23) and by Reay (1953:118).

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634 have numbered several thousand at least (nor did they have a 'distinct dialect and a uniformity of custom' that might indicate that they by themselves constituted a tribe).

Every Orokaiva person is recruited by birth to the clan of his father. All members of this descent unit claim but cannot trace[1] common patrilineal descent from a usually eponymous ancestor; they do not always share the same plant emblem (erahu)[2] commonly held by patrilineal groups. A large number of clans are included among the mountain Orokaiva; clan membership does not often overlap with tribal membership (though see Williams 1928:406; 1930:154). It is very rare for the clan to act as a political unit, whatever its functions in the past. Williams (1930:102-8) has in mind a different kind of unit (a small, usually localized group 'united by feelings of actual kinship', scarcely more distant than nuclear family relationships) when he says the clan was 'co-operative... in respect to ceremonies and feasts, and more importantly of fighting'.

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[C21] There are several clans represented in the great majority of the present villages and fragments of the same clans - what we call clan branches[3] - will be found scattered among similar composite villages, often a considerable distance away.

Clans are not linked to form a wider descent group. Some members of 2 or more distinct named clans, whose ancestors were all at one time known by the one clan name, sometimes profess closer ties to one another for this reason. Jegase clan, for instance, is said to have formerly included groups which have become independent clans.

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1 This disagrees with Williams' description (1930:108) which shows no clear distinction between the clan and lineage (see Royal Anthropological Institute 1960:88-90).

2 Data from Awala and Wasida villages (see Williams 0.83; and Appendix D) differs from the information from Inonda (Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:16).

3 Note that Williams (1925:410 and 420) uses either the term 'local clan branch' or 'subclan' to denote 'an incipient clan' which has moved away from the parent group but retains either the original clan name while acquiring a new plant emblem or the original plant emblem while assuming a new clan name. Elsewhere (1928:125) he describes how some clans occupy several villages or parts of villages. Some 'branches' or 'sections' may have adopted a distinctive name or taken possession of the subdivision of former clan land they occupy, while others may not yet have taken either step (ibid.).

621 possession of its own tracts of land' (1928:125). In view of the
614 uncertainties regarding attributes which, we have noted, Williams associates with the 'clan', we can not readily say whether our discussion in the following sections confirms or contradicts this statement on land tenure.

Fighting within the tribe (emboge), though frequent,[1] was
614 governed by restrictive conventions absent from the conduct of
578 deliberate raids (isoro). Organized aggression was rare and the deliberate destruction and homicide characteristic of the tribal
●[721] raid were absent from the skirmishes which arose periodically in the course of ordinary interclan relationships. Disagreement over rights to land in the neighbourhood was one of a number of causes of interclan hostilities (see Williams 1930:107, 163). But we found no evidence from the area discussed in this report to indicate that land disputes between members of different clans
[721] involved the mobilization of their descent groups. Informants firmly denied that people would resort to attacking neighbours from another clan in order to acquire land.

In presenting a picture of continuous feuding between local
[728] kin groups within the tribe, Keesing (1951:6) quotes Williams out of context: Williams (1930:311; and 160-7) was referring to the ineffectiveness of intertribal truces not to instability of peaceful relationships between these smaller groups when he says that no village lived in permanent security for fear of raids from its neighbours. The tribe lacked close political cohesion but relations between local groups within it do not seem to have been as precarious as Keesing describes. As Plant (1951: Appendix 3) indicates, a network of affiliations between descent groups in widely scattered areas formerly ensured generaly peaceful relations within the tribe.

614 The frequency with which fragments of one clan are found
701 scattered in 3 or more districts of the tribe suggests that here
[182] Langness' discussion of the Highlands (Watson, ed. 1964:174) may be relevant when he points to the probability of a causal connection between continuous violent warfare and the weakly patrilineal structure of groups,[2] in view of the fact that most warring groups needed continually to replace losses in numerical strength by recruiting outsiders; they would repeatedly scatter, regroup, take refuge or attach themselves permanently to stronger groups for

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[1] In fact, Williams (W.37) records that members of Jegase clan once fought some of the Sarahu, even though the names of the 2 clans were linked as the name of the political unit which he defined (see p.34).

[2] See sections c-f of this chapter.

614 safety. Plant for instance (1951:3) notes that the Isivita
701 villages, strategically situated on a ridge, would occasionally give refuge to fellow tribesmen though not every district would usually have recourse to join the Isivita.

619 Williams ascribes the formation of 'somewhat loose' and
[614] temporary 'confederacies of clans', which conducted raids upon
[701] the tribe's kitoho, to a local spirit. But it is not clear whether by this he means the identification of members of a tribe with one territory or the unity of the 'locality group' which usually takes in a number of 'clan-village units' (see p.34) and which he describes as a more restricted 'sympathy-group' than the tribe (1930:107, 157, 163, 309-12). When he states (1925:407) that 'over and above clan patriarchs there are recognised leaders of small clan confederacies and even - in war-time - of tribes', he seems to equate the tribe with the district among the mountain Orokaiva (in particular Wasida and Isivita; see W.23, 124).[1]

[634] However, neither the district nor any other local grouping among the mountain Orokaiva was an independent political unit. The territory of this tribe was not so compact as to call for (or even to enable) all its constituent local groups to give continuous mutual support in protecting the integrity of the area they occupied. Nevertheless members of discrete local groups continually formed ad hoc alliances across district boundaries. It is clear that the regular chains of alliances encompassed a wider area than usually described as the tribe (whether Jegasi-Sarahu, Wasida or Periho).

721 The usual stratagem of the isoro was the surprise attack on 1 or 2 selected villages. In these circumstances the victims were able to summon only immediate neighbours to help ward off the attackers and proximity was at least one of the common principles by which specific villages combined in retaliatory raids.

621 An indication that within this tribe the named local groups of
361 villages were territorially distinct units is Belshaw's statement that the population was divided into 'hamlet groups' like Awala 2,

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[721] [1] There is some doubt whether the evidence in these cases shows that there was even a military leadership in the district (and war is said to have been almost perpetual). The title of the former leader of Isivita (who had not been replaced) is given as embo javoari and the literal meaning is given (1930:104) as 'the man who gives the name' (cf. embo javo vahai, Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:17), i.e., the deceased eponymous ancestor of one clan. The last renowned war-leader among the Wasida may have been the embo peni (javo), lit. man-big (-name), of a group no larger than a village or clan (see 1925:417; W.23).

428 before establishing a household. The older brother should in time provide the other with an equitable share of the land.

There is no system of primogeniture in theory or practice.[1] In one case, however, a childless man, who was adopted into the local branch of Jegase clan and has also married a Jegase woman, either has bequeathed his land to the leader of his wife's lineage who allocated it to his second son, or he has himself bequeathed it specifically to the boy (who was given his wife's deceased brother's name). Most of the patrimonial land and some land held by the woman are to be inherited by the elder son.

241 Turning to the extent of landholding, the 12 households studied hold 138 acres near Sivepe or 2.7 acres per head, all of it arable with the exception of little more than 1 or 2 per cent.[2] Some members claim to retain land in relatively distant areas where they or their forefathers originally lived. In cases where the Sivepe people had not exercised their rights to cultivate these land claims, no estimate of their size was made.

b. The history of local settlement

177 The territory of the mountain Orokaiva was opened up when a new road from Buna to the Yodda Valley goldfields near Kokoda was built in 1904. In this part of Orokaiva country individual tribes were not as isolated as elsewhere. Although the various tribes were initially described as being constantly warring, and likely to [721] attack government parties,[3] peace was secure within 4 years. Intertribal feuds were effectively suppressed, except for an occasional raid prompted by the docility of neighbouring tribes [166] under the novel conditions brought about by the arrival of the Europeans. Many tribes, including the 'Wasida', were able to settle on their outlying lands which formerly they had not occupied for fear of raids.

[464] Many of the people worked on the construction of the road, and later as carriers; by 1909 some had signed on for labour elsewhere

[184] [1] In this way, the mountain Orokaiva differ from at least one other Orokaiva tribe, the Yega at Beporo (R. Dakeyne: personal communication).

[162] [2] This density is the equivalent of 237 persons per square mile (cf. 300-500 per square mile for Southern Chimbu, Brown and Brookfield 1959:74). The Saiho Census Division, on the other hand, has only about 75 persons per square mile; however, as Map 2 indicates, it includes extensive areas of unoccupied and generally unused rainforest surrounding the concentration of populations with higher densities and separating them from their former enemies. Some of the land of the thousands of Kombu Sangara killed in 1951 also appears to fall inside the Saiho boundaries.

[3] See Territory of Papua 1903-4:39; ibid. 1904-5:14, 36.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 41]

613 Overall the land of Berekipa lineage is more fragmented, though less scattered than the holdings of the Bebehupa, which are larger.

From detailed accounts of completed land transfers between the Berekipa and Arehu, whose present holdings are mostly interspersed[1] near the sites of Simbehata and Pusahambo, and from other historical data we infer that this land previously formed far more continuous tracts belonging to descent groups such as these. To a noticeable extent the spatial relations between the shares of the Bebehupa, Berekipa and Arehu in the extended tract of Jegasa land marked by the sites of former settlement can be construed as a teritorial correlate of the pattern of each lineage's ancestors' migrations to or from local groups there. The shifts of residence relevant today are remembered in some detail.

e. Land use and mobility

241 Williams (1928:156) advocated a change from shifting to sedentary agriculture for the Orokaiva on the grounds that the former was wasteful of land and labour, and that the tendency to form small independent settlements resulted from the 'lax method of horticulture which necessitates the clearing of many areas in succession and sometimes a temporary settlement on a distant site'. He considered shifting agriculture to be 'one of the most potent causes of village and clan disintegration'.

[361] Keesing (1951:8) noted that the mountain Orokaiva had generally resisted the post-war movement to consolidate into larger villages. So long as the 'mobile economic base' persisted, he considered that resettlement into larger permanent villages after the Mt Lamington eruption would be unlikely to succeed. The Orokaiva showed no inclination to adopt more intensive sedentary cultivation and he predicted that a return to shifting agriculture would involve 'seasonal movement' outward from the environs of the settlements to new cultivation areas, and later the resumption of settlement in scattered hamlets. In view of these assertions about the connection between agricultural practice and settlement patterns, upon which Williams and Keesing based their discussion of economic development, it may be useful to examine the relations in Sivepe between mobility and village stability on the one hand, and traditional land use on the other.

62 [361] [721] Keesing suggests that the tendency, mentioned by Williams, for the Orokaiva to disperse into smaller residential units since pacification had been particularly marked on these heavily populated slopes. The suppression of intertribal feuding probably

[1] To a lesser extent they are also interspersed with parcels of other lineages' land.

62 facilitated the type of local movements that we noted occurred in
[36] the neighbourhood of Sivepe. However at times[1] the density 'on
[72] the ground' of villages of the standard size found in the other Orokaiva tribes may be misconstrued as a state of advanced fragmentation of settlement.

It should be noted that the limited amount of relevant detail on the areas where Williams worked[2] fails to indicate a significant difference in size between the Aiga village averaging 26 people at that time, and the Wasida village, with about 6 houses and a single-boys' house.

166 The Sivepe people have moved only singly or in small groups
[65] except when villages have been directed to amalgamate by the Administration. The villagers say that, except when they were evacuated to Ilimo refugee camp, they have never been forced to
[14] move from the area which had been held by their ancestors, or to rely on outside groups for access to land. Our evidence indicates that, except for limited expansion into unoccupied land early in the century, all the major shifts of residence of the sample clan branches have been confined to their own territory.

[425] People who have moved to take up rights in other land have done
[614] so by exploiting personal ties of kinship or affinity. We found no instances of overlapping land claims at the clan or local branch level such as are found in other areas of Orokaiva territory where enough land was available for whole clans to move the location of their settlement some distance to unused land of a friendly group.

621 Belshaw (1951:3) observed that in the years preceding the Mt Lamington eruption

> there was much feeling among Government officers that the relatively poor houses of the district, and the small hamlets, should give way to new villages built on the 'Kokoda' pattern, that is a line of substantial houses built around a grassy village square.

[78] The people tended to resist this change, but they had made some
[166] moves to amalgamate 'hamlets' (see p.34). He noted also that there was much movement between villages, and that it usually involved a man's leaving his father's land to live on that of his mother or his wife.

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1 For instance, when the densely populated area stretching from Isivita to Isoge and Awala villages struck the writer of one generally observant report as 'literally a mass of small hamlets' some of them with no more than 20 members.

2 See Williams 1930:7; W.1.

not necessarily leaders in the old authority structure but often people with particular experience of white rule (e.g., policemen).[1] Both cults were suppressed by the Administration although the Taro cult persisted until 1928 and possibly reappeared in the Gona-Buna area in 1941 (Worsley 1957:124), concurrent with rumours of imminent Japanese landings.

The ending of inter-tribal skirmishing, which directly affected the social roles of the sexes, also extended the physical range of interactions open to individuals and resulted in the proliferation of hamlet groups, comprising single clan-branches, i.e. a fragmentation of the main villages. Administrative efforts in this period were directed towards countering this latter process and concentrating settlements along the roads to facilitate supervision, encouraging improved building styles (particularly the erection of houses on stilts above the ground) and establishing more ordered 'line' villages built around a central square.

(b) Commencement of cash cropping

From its beginnings the mainstay of government policy was the encouragement of indigenous cash cropping. Regulations introduced in 1894 and 1903 provided for compulsory plantings of economic trees, particularly coconuts, rubber and citrus, but few were exploited commercially. Under the Native Plantations Ordinance 1918 and the Native Plantations Ordinances 1925-52, twenty-six community plantations were established in the Orokaiva area with both government and villagers participating.[2] Cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cotton, tobacco and rice were all tried; however, owing to a fall in prices, all but coffee were abandoned. According to Crocombe (1964:16), there was no enthusiasm among the people for the scheme as they considered the cash returns inadequate: each man was required to work sixty full days per year and returns varied from less than $1 to $8 per year, which was well below the returns from working on European plantations at that time. Some 10,000 trees, predominantly coconut, were planted in 1914-15 in the Orokaiva area and by 1921 it was estimated that there were 46,404 coconut trees in the Northern Division and some 7,000 rubber trees (mostly in the Awala area). The planting of coffee commenced in 1923 and by 1936 there were

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[1] Such a development may well also have been characterised by the building up of more extensive group solidarities. Burridge (1960:25) does suggest, however, that the Taro cult may have been a particular expression of a similar type of cult occurring in the pre-contact era.

[2] Proceeds deriving from the sale of the crops were shared on a 50-50 basis. For a detailed treatment of these communal plantings see Crocombe 1964.

tween sub-clans or villages.(1)

Officers of the Department of Native Affairs are still in some instances able to effect reconciliations or to settle disputes despite their lack of legal powers. This is not only because disputants are sometimes prepared to accept the judgement of a disinterested third party, but also because almost all Orokaiva people we have met are of the opinion that patrol staff do have the power to enforce their "recommendations". The fear of sorcery is still recognized as a sanction against transgression of property rights and informants quoted instances of sorcery having been used to punish transgressions of fishing rights. It is a commonplace that where adequate alternative facilities for settling disputes are not available, sorcery tends to increase. Though it is certainly extant in Inonda we have no evidence to indicate whether it is increasing or not.

The definition of boundaries and owning sub-clans would increase social stability and security of tenure, but in the course of time, due to population increase in some clans and decrease in others, it would become increasingly unrelated to clan needs. It is therefore necessary that any action to define boundaries and ownership should be associated with facilities for the transfer of rights between clans, or between individual members of different clans.

In the pre-contact era warfare was probably the most important means by which major areas of land were transferred between descent groups, and when warfare is abolished it is essential that alternative facilities for land transfer be provided. In many colonial territories where warfare previously tended to bring land areas into line with population numbers, colonial governments have abolished warfare but have not provided adequate alternative means of transfer, and this invariably leads

(1) Disputes between sub-clans or villages are sometimes settled by the Executive of the Higaturu Council. They have no legal power to enforce decisions, but they are often able to persuade parties to accept their advice.

to maldistribution of land.(1)

The individual lacks security of tenure for his cash crops, but not for his food crops. In the case of the coffee blocks on Endehi'undi land a reasonable degree of security has been achieved by registration under the Higaturu Council scheme.(2) Nobody dares apply for registration for cash crop blocks on Inonda land for fear of objections by the Tandai'undi but even if these were overcome, there would probably still be inadequate security of tenure for cash crops even within the sub-clans. The size and value of blocks hardly merit the cost in time and money of precision surveying and government registration, and the present Higaturu Council registration scheme would appear to us to be well suited to the present conditions, if it was supported by the Administration and by appropriate legislation.(3)

Economic trees and other personal wealth appear to have always been held either by individuals or by small groups of siblings (though subject to specific obligations to kin). The possession of income-producing trees by individuals is thus in harmony with traditional concepts of rights to trees. In the traditional culture, however, rights to trees did not necessarily coincide with rights to the land on which they were planted, beyond the right of access and the use of such land as was

(1) Formal provisions for transfer under certain circumstances are contained in the Land (Tenure Conversion) Bill 1963. This bill has not yet been passed by the Legislative Assembly. The transfer system provided for, however, does not apply to any land until it has been dealt with by the Land Titles Commission. Unless the Commission is provided with enormous resources or delegates its routine functions to local bodies it will be unable to provide such facilities for all but a small fraction of the Territory for many years to come.

(2) The Higaturu Council scheme is explained in Appendix A[A]

(3) Official policy as expounded by the Minister for Territories (Hasluck 1960:1019-21), states that the only acceptable form of title is that issued by central government (and thus the Higaturu Council registration scheme is not acceptable). Administrative practice has not been consistent, and at some times the scheme has been given official support, while at others instructions have been issued for its discontinuance or for discouragement of expansion. Present practice is to give the scheme cautious support, but there is considerable doubt as to whether the council by-law which established the scheme is legally valid, or whether councils have the power to make by-laws on such matters. To date, the question has not been tested at law.

A [See Category 657, pp. 89-96--Analyst]

628 position in the structure: they held, one might say, a dual citizenship: effective citizenship in Sivepa where they lived, and residual citizenship in Soroputa and Agenahambo (in the case of one of them). Other Sivepa men held a similar kind of residual citizenship in various Isivita villages, e.g., Kiorota, Bagevoturu and others again in Awala, Koropata, etc. The marks of this residual citizenship were in each case: residual land rights (e.g., hunting and fishing rights, rights to the produce of certain trees), regular visiting, clearly traceable kinship links in the [621] patri- or matriline. In inter-village contacts we may therefore distinguish two types of role: the leader and the ambassador. The leader does not directly deal with the leader of another village, except if he happens to have residual citizenship there. Trust can be established only if the approach is made by a residual citizen who, by implication, is offering tangible security (his residual citizenship rights) for the truthfulness of his words and the honesty of his intentions.

It is in the relations with places such as Soroputa and Agenahambo that we can still see the traditional pattern of inter-village relations; within the Sasembata district itself, this pattern has become slightly obscured by the development of new forms of organisation under the influence of mission and government. Nonetheless, even in the type of relations I have just discussed, the pax Australiana has had its influence. If we survey the short list of inter-village linkages between Sivepa and the more distant parts of the Waseta "tribe" (and "more distant" effectively means no more here than over four miles away), we notice that in pre-contact times, wars with Waseta and Isivita were reported. The feast offered to Togahou by Sivepa in 1967 was an unprecendented event; the persons who mediated between the two villages to arrange the feast were descendants of war captives.

628 From the viewpoint of the present study, it is interesting
619 to inquire whether the eruption has had any effects that drew the Waseta "tribe" more closely together. This question is complicated [731] by the conflicting descriptions we have of Orokaiva "tribes." A full discussion of the nature of Orokaiva "tribes" would be out of place here. Rimoldi (1966: 29-37) brings forward some strong arguments why a division into tribes, as attempted by Chinnery and Beaver, and Williams, is a hazardous enterprise. I have already stated my own opinion that the Orokaiva view of his social world is a set of concentric circles of increasing radius. Thus, I would agree with Williams that there is an area, comprising several dozen villages, within which an Orokaiva practices what Williams calls "intra-group morality" (1930: 311). Normally these several dozen villages are those immediately surrounding the village of [582] residence. Within this area, marriages are contracted, cannibalistic [721] raids do not occur and fights tend to involve comparatively little [266] bloodshed. The circle of "intra-group morality" varies for every

CHAPTER V: Familiarity with New Homeland

In spite of the pax Australiana, Orokaiva still view with some apprehension visits to villages of traditional enemies, if friendship has not been explicitly established between visitors and host village. In 1951, this feeling of apprehension was even stronger than today. I was told that in pre-contact times a man would be extremely rash to visit a village where he was unknown as he might well be killed. Even then, however, it was sufficient protection if a visitor was able to ask by name for a kinsman or friend resident in that village. This person would then take the visitor under his protection and he would come to no harm in the host village.

A story about a football match held in Sangara shortly before the eruption demonstrates the dangers that existed even then. A Sangara team had visited a village in the Gona district and had defeated its hosts at football. On the way back home, a member of the team fell ill and died from blood poisoning. The Sangara people attributed the death to sorcery by the defeated village. When shortly afterwards this village visited Sangara to play the return match, the Sangara came to the football field armed with hidden knives, guns and pineapple clubs, intending to kill their guests. A bloodbath was avoided only by a thunderstorm during which the match was cancelled.

In these circumstances, it is understandable that the Sangara and Isivita people were unhappy about their evacuation to camps in the coastal region after the eruption. It was not, of course, the specific instance just quoted that made them uneasy but a general apprehension of danger. Certainly, deaths and illness occurring in these camps were very liable to be ascribed to sorcery. This is no doubt one reason why the government lost no time in closing the coastal camps down and bringing the inhabitants back inland, placing them in temporary accommodation in Popondetta end April, even before permanent resettlement villages for Sangara could be planned.

The camp at Ilimo did not create the same kind of worry, as Orokaiva has no reason to fear sorcery on the part of the Ilimo people. The Sivepe people feared no harm from Ilimo because two Sivepe families had friendly and kinship relations there, while there was no history of hostility between the two places. Ilimo, furthermore, was near some European plantations where people of Sasembata district at times found employment. While the Sivepe people were in the camp, they were on visiting terms with the village people. It is important to realise that the pivot of the friendly relations between these two villages were a small number of individuals who were linked by formal bonds. Of the two bonds, one was affinal while the other was a friendship bond based on contact between a Sivepe plantation worker and Ilimo village people.